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ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET: A
DUTY TO MONITOR PATENT RISK FROM THE
BOARDROOM
Ian David McClure†
Patent risk is on the rise; and not just because there is more patent
litigation now than ever before. The value of strategic patent
management is no longer an unknown or ignored ingredient to
corporate success. Nor is proactive and pragmatic patent risk
assessment. Shareholders and investors have now caught on that patent
management and patent risk affect the value of their equity. This
realization has initiated a circuitous life cycle in which more patents
are being transacted, divested and strategically managed, resulting in
more patent risk for operating companies to monitor. Yet, this last
piece—the proactive monitoring of patent risk—may have serious
consequences to many companies if wrong decisions are made. For
example, because over 96% of companies in the United States make
less than $10 million in annual revenues, a patent litigation costing the
average $2.5 million could be a “bet the company” event. Therefore,
when so much shareholder value is at stake, there is a very reasonable
policy argument that the level of accountability should meet the level
of the risk. After all, corporate boards of directors are accountable for
guarding shareholder value. As this article will demonstrate, they
may—and perhaps should—have a fiduciary duty to those shareholders
to monitor excessive patent risk taking by the company. The health of
innovation and our knowledge economy may depend on it.

† Ian D. McClure is an experienced corporate, M&A and intellectual property
transactions attorney and licensing business development professional. He is a member of the
“IAM Strategy 300 – The World’s Leading IP Strategists” (IAM Magazine). B.A. in Economics
from Vanderbilt University (cum laude), J.D. from Chapman University’s Fowler School of Law
(magna cum laude), and L.L.M. from DePaul University College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
The value of intangible assets, of which intellectual property is a
component, relative to other corporate assets has ballooned from 20%
to 80% of corporate value since 1975.1 Supporting the proximate
accuracy of this measurement is the incredible increase in patent filings
over the same period.2 Specifically, four times the number of patent

1. Ocean Tomo Announces Results of Annual Study of Intangible Asset Market Value,
OCEAN TOMO MEDIA ROOM (June 15, 2010), http://www.oceantomo.com/media/newsreleases
/Intangible-Asset-Market-Value-Study-Release. As Ocean Tomo’s Chairman James E.
Malackowski explained:
Within the last quarter century, the market value of the S&P 500 companies has
deviated greatly from their book value. This “value gap” indicates that physical
and financial accountable assets reflected on a company’s balance sheet comprises
less than 20% of the true value of the average firm. . . . Our further research shows
that a significant portion of this intangible value is represented by patented
technology.
Id.
2. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart 1963–2013, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2015, 12:21
AM). Utility patent applications actually decreased year-on-year in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1991,
1996, 2008, and 2009, but continued their upward trajectory nonetheless. Id.; see also Robert
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applications were filed in 2012 than in 1975.3 This has resulted in an
increased focus on IP protection and enforcement, as is evidenced by
the steady rise in patent litigation since 1990,4 capped by an
unprecedented 30% increase in patent litigation filings in 2012 to reach
5,000 patent suits filed in a year for the first time in history.5
As the number of patent assertions rises, an operating company’s
ignorance or excessive risk-taking relative to problematic patents
owned by other entities—regardless of those entities’ operational
endeavors—increases the probability of suit.6 An emphasis on strategic
patent management as an independent business operation has created a
sophisticated-patent intermediary and services market over the past 10
years, spurring an influx of patent service firms and software tools
which make patent search and freedom to operate analysis quite
manageable in many markets.7 Nevertheless, the practice of ignoring
patents is driven in part by traditional course of dealing relative to the
current willful infringement legal doctrine, or at least by parties’
general adherence to courts’ application of a low standard for actual
notice. Reasoning that they are mitigating risk, companies often fail to
search or engage in ex-ante license negotiations before it is too late.
Moreover, companies often take on risk by making decisions relative
to known problematic patents in view of who owns the patent and their
propensity to enforce it. That risk is growing as patents are increasingly
being asserted or transferred to entities with a greater propensity to
enforce.8
Sterne & Trevor Chaplick, Why Directors Must Take Responsibility For Intellectual Property,
IAM MAG., Feb–Mar. 2005, at 16, 20 (“The role of IP in certain industry sectors was much less
prominent a decade ago. . . . Today all industry sectors embrace IP.”).
3. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 2.
4. Sterne & Chaplick, supra note 2, at 20.
5. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 (2013), http://
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf
[hereinafter PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY].
6. See Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19–22 (2008).
7. Ian McClure & James Malackowski, The Next Big Thing in IP Monetization: A Natural
Progression to Exchange-Traded Units, LANDSLIDE, May-June 2011, at 32, 32–36 (summary of
IP intermediary market development); see also Steve Lohr, Patent Auctions Offer Protections to
Inventors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/technology
/21patent.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=patent%20auctions&st=cse (the IP market has experienced “a
flurry of new companies and investment groups . . . to buy, sell, broker, license and auction
patents.”).
8. Patents are being asserted in record-setting number of lawsuits as mentioned in the
PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5. For examples of companies transferring their patents
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With regard to patent ignorance, despite an assumed heightened
standard under In re Seagate Technology,9 willful infringement
findings have not significantly waned,10 and the risk of treble
damages11 causes companies to turn a blind eye to troublesome
patents.12 As a result, notwithstanding the merits of any particular case,
licensing efforts frequently fail to reach a negotiation or even an
introduction. This circumstance becomes anticipated by patent holders,
often resorting to litigation first to avoid wasted time or ensure choice
of venue. An increasingly common practice is to file a complaint first
and send a copy of the complaint without notice of service to the
alleged infringer, forcing a time sensitive decision.13 Because the
allotted time is often not enough time to complete proper diligence and
financial risk analysis, and because the patentee cannot back off of their
initial position and let the complaint lapse, litigation is commenced.

for enforcement purposes, see John Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, Outsourcing Patent Enforcement:
The Effect of “Patent Privateers” on Litigation and R&D Investments 2–3 (2014), available at
http://bit.ly/1DikE2g (discussing examples that include Nokia and Sony selling parts of their
portfolios to MobieMedia, a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that then sued Apple, HTC and
Research in Motion (citing Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters Against Apple,
Google, Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2013)); Micron sold at least 20% of its patent portfolio between
2009 and 2013 to Round Rock, a PAE who asserted these patents against SanDisk (citing Ashby
Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2012)); suits not limited to the hightech industry, as Nike in 2006 sold part of its patent portfolio to Cushion Technologies, LLC who
later sued several of Nike’s rivals in the athletic shoe business).
9. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
10. Christopher Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 464–70 (2012) (Seaman’s empirical study
found that willful infringement has been found in only about 10% fewer cases after Seagate).
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed.”).
12. Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 286 (2012)
(“Successful searching carries a penalty—the risk of treble damages. As a result, many companies
do not even try to identify the patents that their products may tread upon, remaining ignorant of
the risks they run until it is too late.”).
13. See Michael Curley, Radical Reform for Patent Demand Letters, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MAG., May 2014, 15, 15–16, available at http://bit.ly/1vFh4i0 (“The incentive here
would be for the enforcing party to file suit and then conduct licensing negotiations on the
phone . . . a safer path than writing a demand letter, which both gives the accused infringer
advanced notice . . . and risks drawing the ire of the FTC”); see also Gene Quinn, Motorola Sues
Apple for Patent Infringement Using Sparse Complaint, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 8, 2010), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/08/motorola-sues-apple-for-patent-infringement-with-sparse-co
mplaint/id=12763/ (detailing the prevalent use of sparse complaints used to simply file a case,
perhaps without merit, in order to force settlement).
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Although patent infringement is already a strict liability offense,14
raising up a duty to identify and manage patent risk may be in the
interest of the corporations performing competitive analysis by helping
to avoid suit and accelerate innovation. This benefits diversified
shareholders and society. Moreover, the commercial practice of some
companies related to patent “knowledge,” in anticipation of their use
and import in future patent litigation, is counterintuitive to the mission
of the patent system to disseminate patent information. Patent search
and assessing patent risk is increasingly practicable, and intentional
ignorance of—or excessive risk-taking relative to—problematic
patents should be subject to stricter scrutiny and oversight.
Accountability for the knowledge and litigation risk identified
above should match the level of that risk. Patent infringement damages
awards continue to break records, and 2012 was again a benchmark
year with multiple billion-dollar awards.15 Moreover, the risk does not
reside only in losing. As the demand for competent patent attorneys to
pursue or defend these actions has ascended, the fixed costs of patent
litigation remains high.16 These typically unplanned expenses and
potential liabilities do in fact move the needle for shareholders17 and
can result in company downfall or, more frequently, restricted patent
filings to account for the cost.18 All of these effects reduce shareholder
value. As a result, there is a reasonable argument that the responsibility

14.
15.
16.

Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368 (stating that patent infringement is a strict liability offense).
PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5.
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 2013 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013).
17. See SANGJUN NAM & CHANGI NAM, THE IMPACT OF PATENT LITIGATION ON
SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE IT INDUSTRY 3 (2012), available at http://EconPapers.repec.org
/RePEc:zbw:itsb12:72514 (summarizing findings from multiple studies that: (a) the wealth effect
of patent litigation is negative for defendant firms and insignificant for plaintiff firms; (b) the
wealth effect of patent litigation on biotechnology firms has a negative effect on stock prices; and
(c) the wealth effect of patent litigation for US public firms was also negative on defendant firms
from 1984 to 1999, after controlling certain factors pertaining to characteristics).
18. See Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact On American Innovation and Jobs, and
Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, & the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 11 (2013); see also Diomed Patent
Defendant Files for Chapter 11, Posted in Mass High Tech Blog, BOS. BUS. J. (Jan. 22, 2008, 2:40
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2008/01/diomed-patent-defendant
-files-for-chapter-11.html; see also Ameet Sachdev, Football Gear Maker Files for Bankruptcy
After Losing Patent-Infringement Suit, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2010), http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/2010-09-14/business/ct-biz-0914-chicago-law-20100914_1_schutt-sports-riddellpatent.
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for monitoring this risk should go to the level responsible for guarding
shareholder value: the board of directors.
The current literature comments on a fiduciary duty to monitor
and to manage risk in many contexts, including illegal employee action
and excessive risk taking in financial services.19 This literature does not
explore a duty to manage patent risk. This article will discuss such a
duty and ultimately conclude that a director fiduciary duty to monitor
patent risk likely exists—and should.
First, this article sets the stage by explaining that developments in
the patent transaction market over the past decade have increased the
value, and the risk, that patents present to operating companies. Next,
the article visits the development and prospect for enforcement of a
duty to monitor under a line of Delaware cases and other academic
comment on a duty to manage risk. The discussion focuses on the
highest level of corporate accountability to demonstrate that the door is
appropriately ajar for this duty to be recognized. In identifying support
for such a duty, this article distinguishes risk in the patent context from
strictly financial risk. After defining the duty, the article demonstrates
that it is unlikely that the boards of most corporations in the U.S. satisfy
their duty. Next, this article shows that the accountability at this highest
level must necessarily start with—and should be satisfied by—the
provision for adequate information reporting lines leading to decisions
which are subject to adequate oversight. Finally, this article will
identify policy reasons why this accountability should benefit
shareholders, members of society, and participants in a troubled patent
market.
I.

INCREASED STRATEGY AND RISK IN THE PATENT MARKET
A. Evidence of Increased Patent Strategy

For many companies worldwide, IP strategy has become
paramount. Receiving new mandates to generate revenue from IP,
companies are increasingly selling patents20 or structuring privateering
19. See Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial
Crisis, 3 ILL. L. REV. 859 (2013).
20. In January 2012, wireless firm Adaptix sold more than 200 patents to patent licensing
firm Acacia. See Ben Dummett, Acacia to Acquire Adaptix for $160 Million, WALL ST. J., Jan.
12, 2012, available at http://on.wsj.com/1FzUtnr. In July 2012, Fujifilm sold 1,200 patents to
patent licensing and technology firm, Universal Display. See FUJIFILM Corporation Sells Its
Worldwide OLED Patent Portfolio to Universal Display Corporation for US $105 Million,
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deals to generate revenues from these assets.21 Deals that transfer
patents to independent third parties in return for participation in
licensing and litigation proceeds continue to remain popular through
2013, transforming patents into a lucrative article of trade.22
A well-publicized example, of both the increased recognition of
the strategic value intellectual property and the increased dependency
on patents to compete, is the recent sale of the bankrupt Nortel
Networks Corporation’s patent portfolio. After most of Nortel’s other
assets were sold to various companies for an approximate aggregate
value of $3 billion, Nortel’s patent portfolio presumably protecting
these assets and businesses was sold through auction for $4.5 billion to
a non-practicing entity called Rockstar Consortium, owned by a group
of operating entities.23 This auction demonstrates the old guard and the
new guard with respect to patent strategy. Representing the old guard
through Nortel’s role, the event highlights what companies have
traditionally neglected to recognize, namely, the value of patent assets
attributable to shareholder value. Representing the new guard, it
demonstrates through the role of the winning bidders and the Rockstar
executives that helped engineer the transaction, the increased emphasis
on the value of patent assets, namely, the significance of high-stakes
patent weaponry to competition. Specifically, the winning bid came
from a consortium of companies, all aligned by the same competitive
FUJIFILM (July 24, 2012), http://www.fujifilm.com/news/n120724.html. On December 16,
2013, Panasonic solid 900 patents to patent licensing firm Wi-Lan, and on January 6th it sold 500
additional patents to patent licensing firm Inventergy. See Joff Wild, Panasonic Makes A Major
Privateering Play As Japanese Companies Seek To Sweat Their Patents, IAM BLOG (Jan. 10,
2014), http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=9375cbd5-7354-41fe-bd18-32a5d392
bfde. AT&T has a public website for patent sales. See Patent Sales, AT&T, http://
www.att.com/gen/sites/ipsales?pid=17701 (last visited June 7, 2014). These represent a fraction
of the number of such deals consummated over the past 5 years.
21. Ashby Jones, The Amazing Adventures of Mr. Desmarais and Mr. Powers, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/23/the-amazing-adventures-of-mr
-desmarais-and-mr-powers/; see also Susan Decker, Patent Privateers Sail the Legal Waters
Against Apple and Google, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-01-11/patent-privateers-sail-the-legal-waters-against-apple-google.html (noting Nokia has
transferred its patents to privateers for licensing income more than 20-times since 2008); see also
Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors,
4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 2 (2011) (“. . . operating companies have increasingly explored
indirect uses of IPRs, from buying patents and then asserting them against competitors to buying
patents solely for the purpose of filing a countersuit in an infringement litigation initiated by a
competitor.”).
22. Id.
23. See Nortel, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nortel (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).
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interest—to keep the patents out of the hands of Google.24 Therefore,
the patents had significant defensive value. Some of the patents have
since been asserted, highlighting their offensive value as well.25 In
November 2013, Rockstar sued Google, Asustek, HTC, Huawei, LG
Electronics, Pantech, Samsung, and ZTE for infringement of seven of
the Nortel patents purchased.26
Another example of a strategic privateering transaction is Nokia’s
sale of patents to a small public company, Vringo, Inc., which has
attempted to commercialize its own technology but can attribute nearly
all of its value to patent monetization. In August 2012, Nokia sold 124
patent families to Vringo for $22 million.27 The 124 patent families
comprise over 500 patents and applications including 110 issued
patents in the US, and over 45 patents families have at least one patent
in force in various European jurisdictions.28 At the time, Vringo was
suing Google for infringement of Vringo’s other patents. Its litigation
team included Donald Stout, the co-founder of NTP, which in 2006
received a $612.5 million patent infringement settlement from
Research In Motion Ltd., the maker of the BlackBerry, and David
Cohen, the former senior litigation counsel at Nokia.29 The deal with
Nokia provided Vringo with additional leverage, as well as a channel
for Nokia to outsource and participate in the proceeds of Vringo’s
future enforcement of Nokia’s patents. Vringo’s enforcement of
Nokia’s patents has already begun, as Vringo has filed numerous
lawsuits against ZTE with the Nokia patents.30 The deal gives Nokia a
35% share in all licensing income received once Vringo has recouped
24. Joff Wild, Google Bid $4 Billion for the Nortel Patents and Still Lost, IAM BLOG
(July 2, 2011), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=1d7387a7-70fc-4e12-807b-e5
68c19f63e1.
25. See Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone Makers, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.worldipreview.com/news/rock
star-files-lawsuit-against-google-and-smartphone-makers.
26. Id.
27. See Nokia to Sell 500 Patents to Licensing Firm Vringo, YAHOO! FINANCE (Aug. 9,
2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nokia-sell-500-patents-licensing-193248944.html.
28. See Vringo, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vringo (last visited June 7,
2014).
29. Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone Makers, supra note 25.
30. Vringo has filed lawsuits against ZTE in the UK and France. See Vringo Files Lawsuit
Against ZTE, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201210
08005706/en/Vringo-Files-Lawsuit-ZTE#U5OCNU1OW00; see also Vringo Expands Patent
Suits Against ZTE, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/vringo
-expands-patent-suits-against-zte-2013-04-01.
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the initial purchase price.31 Patent office assignment records also show
that Alcatel-Lucent has since transferred assets to Vringo, presumably
to take advantage of the same strategic “hands-off” monetization
approach that Nokia is benefiting from.32
B. Evidence of Increased Patent Risk
Patent market transactions that transfer assets to non-practicing
entities, such as the ones highlighted above, have played a large part in
the continuous rise in patent litigation since 1990.33 Quite simply, an
increased focus by operating entities on the strategic value and revenue
generation of patents, coupled with a market influx of patent assertion
entities (PAE)34 playing the role of speculators, has led to increased
proactive management and assertion of patents.35 As was already
31. Mark Summerfield, Courts Play Host to NPE Global Licensing Strategies, IAM BLOG
(Nov. 13. 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/reports/detail.aspx?g=52eeb6d7-78e9-4f8e-9e
2a-e077e1ae42f4.
32. Joff Wild, Alcatel Agrees Privateering Hook-Up With Vringo; Expect More Such Deals
to Follow, IAM BLOG (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=ad
a129d1-6957-46ed-8bf4-3c068cb5690d.
33. Sterne and Chaplick, supra note 2, at 20; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 26 (2013),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf (“About 12 percent of PMEs sued 10
defendants or more in a single lawsuit, compared to about 3 percent of operating companies, a
statistically significant difference. Thus, even with bringing about a fifth of all patent infringement
lawsuits from 2007 to 2011, PMEs sued close to one-third of the overall defendants, accounting
for about half of the overall increase in defendants. Additionally, the estimated total number of
defendants sued by PMEs more than tripled from 834 in 2007 to 3,401 in 2011.”). Rockstar, the
entity that purchased the Nortel patent assets, has since filed multiple litigations asserting
infringement of these patents. See Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone
Makers, supra note 25. Vringo has filed patent litigation involving the assets it purchased from
Nokia. See Vringo Files Lawsuit Against ZTE, supra note 30.
34. An attempt to define an NPE is an entirely different matter outside the bounds and
purpose of this article. It has been the subject of much academic, industry and legislative comment
over previous years, highlighted by the recent introduction of the Saving High-Tech Innovators
from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act bill. See H.R. 845, 113th Congress (2013–2014),
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/845 For a taste of the many
perspectives and problematic policy issues in defining an patent assertion entity, non-practicing
entity, or “patent troll” (this author does not condone use of the “patent troll” term, for reasons
that should be obvious by reviewing these perspectives), see Is RPX an NPE?, RPX BLOG (Nov.
2, 2010), http://www.rpxcorp.com/2010/11/02/is-rpx-an-npe/; see also What is an NPE?,
PATENTFREEDOM.COM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/background/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2015); see also Brian Hannon & Margaret Welsh, Challenges of Defining a Patent Troll,
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 29, 2014), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions
/challenges-of-defining-a-patent-troll/.
35. Rockstar Files Lawsuit Against Google and Smartphone Makers, supra note 25.
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highlighted herein, patent litigation filings increased by a record
breaking 30% in 2012 to reach over 5,000 patent suits filed in a year
for the first time in history.36 While it is important to point out that the
2012 surge was partly a direct result of companies’ attempt to beat the
implementation of the America Invents Act in that same year, patent
litigation filings increased by 11.2% from 5,778 in 2012 to 6,427 filings
in 2013, demonstrating that patent infringement lawsuits are indeed on
the rise.37 Contrary to the belief of many, PAE’s are not the sole cause
of the increase in patent litigation. Operating entities have also
accounted for increased filings, undoubtedly driven by the focus on
patent strategy and the opportunity to win big or collapse a
competitor.38 Additionally, PAE’s generally would not be able to
litigate patents but for the sale of those patents to them by operating
entities. More than 80% of patents litigated by PAE’s are from
operating entities, and more than 1,000 companies have transferred
patents to PAE’s.39
Without regard to the risky outcome of patent litigation, the
average fixed costs are extraordinarily high for any company. On
average, when between $1 million and $25 million is at risk, patent
litigation costs reach $2.5 million, and when more than $25 million is
at risk these costs reach $5 million.40 Yet, the increased possibility of
patent litigation being filed and the standard cost required to play is not
the totality of the risk. Patent infringement damages awards continue
to break records. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013 Patent
Litigation Study,41 “[p]rior to 2012, only three patent infringement
36. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5.
37. PatStats, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER, http://www.patstats.org/Pat
stats3.html (last updated Apr. 25, 2014) (“For 2013 Eastern Texas was highest, with 1513 filings
in 2013 (versus 1266 cases in 2012), now 23.5% of the national total. Second was Delaware, with
1336 filings (up from 997 in 2012), now 20.8% of the national total. Central California was again
a distant third, dropping from 517 cases in 2012 to 486 in 2013.”).
38. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5.
39. The Patent Assertion Problem, THE LICENSE ON TRANSFER (LOT) NETWORK,
http://www.lotnet.com/patent-assertion-problem/index.cfm (last visited July 19, 2014).
40. 2013 REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 16; see also Linda Chiem, HighStakes IP Work Continues Its Steady Climb, GCs Say, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles
/470061/high-stakes-ip-work-continues-its-steady-climb-gcs-say (last updated Sept. 9, 2013 1:52
PM ET) (“In 2010 IP litigation was a $2.4 billion legal market. It climbed to $2.8 billion in 2012,
to $2.9 billion in 2013 and is projected to reach $3 billion in 2014”).
41. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5, at 2 (noting also that “[t]he outcomes of
these matters have varied so far. Monsanto v. DuPont settled for a ten-year $1.75 billion license;
the $1.05 billion award in Apple v. Samsung was reduced by $450 million and likely will be
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damages awards eclipsed the $1 billion mark. But last year alone, three
cases, tried before juries in separate districts, resulted in awards of $1
billion or greater: Monsanto v. DuPont,42 Apple v. Samsung,43 and
Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell.”44 In two of these cases,
DuPont and Marvell, shareholders have filed ongoing derivative
lawsuits against the company, board and its executives for, among
other claims, breaches of fiduciary duties related to mishandling patent
infringement, the patent infringement lawsuit and, put simply, patent
risk.45
The median damages award was approximately $4.9 million
between 2007 and 2012. While the median jury award was many times
greater than the median bench award, one empirical study has found
that during this same period courts awarded enhanced damages more
often than juries when finding willful infringement. The enhanced
damages awarded by courts during this time have been, on average,
greater than juries.46
In sum, patent owners are increasingly managing and divesting
assets that, at one time, may not have been utilized in the same way. As
a result, the value of such assets has increased to their holders, and the
risk that such assets present to operating entities has increased. The
growing focus on patent monetization and resulting litigation raises a
new bar for accountability with respect to risk taking relative to
patents—or put more simply, infringement.

modified further; and Carnegie Mellon v. Marvell remains in the post-trial phase and continues in
this phase as of June 7, 2014.”).
42. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 09-cv-686, U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis Aug. 1, 2012)
43. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
44. Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 2d 637
(W.D. Pa. 2012).
45. See Voss v. Sutardja, case No. 5:14-cv-01581 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 2014); see also
Zomolosky v. Kullman, case No. 1:13-cv-00094 (D. Del. filed Jan. 16, 2013). These cases are
ongoing and, while the purpose of this article is not to address these cases individually, their
claims are very relevant to the concepts explored here and their outcomes could invoke a followup comment to this article.
46. Christopher Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 464–70 (2012). But the study also found that
courts have found willful infringement in a meaningfully less percentage of cases than juries have
since Seagate, whereas this comparison was close to equal before. See id. at 444–49.
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II. A DUTY TO MONITOR EXCESSIVE PATENT RISK-TAKING
A. Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Risk
Following the 2008 financial crisis, many people, including
investors, academics, and politicians called for greater oversight of
corporate risk-taking.47 Two well known corporate governance authors,
Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell, pinned this oversight at the top:
“Boards should be charged with monitoring for risks arising from
corporations’ operations and procedures . . . that might significantly
harm both shareholders and society at large.”48 Yet, properly
identifying, defining and successfully alleging breach of this duty “has
famously been characterized as one of the hardest for shareholders to
win.”49 Indeed, shareholder suits following the financial crisis—an
event demonstrating a seemingly obvious failure of accountability for
risk—failed. Yet, there is good reason—and court precedent—
supporting existence of a duty to monitor risk, or the “oversight duty,”
and existence of a duty presumes some circumstance for breach.50 The
lineage of court opinions that create, categorize, and limit this duty tell
us a lot about its potential application and enforcement related to patent
risk. Specifically, a director fiduciary duty to monitor a corporation’s
patent risk likely exists, and for good reason.
1. Review of Fiduciary Duties
As corporate fiduciaries, the members of the board of directors
have obligations to the corporation that are guided by a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty.51 Under the duty of care, the board owes a duty
47. ERIC J. PAN, DUTY TO MONITOR UNDER DELAWARE LAW: FROM CAREMARK TO
CITIGROUP, THE CONFERENCE BOARD 1–2 (2010) (“The absence of adequate board oversight is
partially to blame for the catastrophic losses suffered by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG,
and Citigroup . . . if they had [provided oversight], perhaps the catastrophic losses suffered by
these firms could have been prevented.”); see also CHRISTINE HURT, THE DUTY TO MANAGE
RISK, ILLINOIS PROGRAM IN LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 2–4 (2013).
48. See Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial
Crisis, supra note 19.
49. Id.
50. PAN, supra note 47, at 3 (“The duty to monitor is an obligation to prevent harm to the
corporation. The board may breach its duty when harm occurs due to its inattention or inaction.”);
see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
51. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (“[a]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as
part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to
act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing
. . . Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability.”).
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to exercise good business judgment and to use ordinary care and
prudence in the operation of the business.52 Although there is no
statutory codification of the duty of care in the Delaware General
Corporation Law, Delaware courts have shaped the duty through a web
of opinions. It is included in the Model Business Corporation Act
sections 8.30 and 8.31, which was largely adopted by many states.53
Importantly for the purposes of this article, one tenet of the duty
of care was shaped by the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision in 1985,
namely, that board decisions must be adequately informed.54 Van
Gorkom is also famously recognized as one of the only successful
shareholder claims of director liability for breach of the duty of care,
as legislators and courts have sought to limit this director liability as a
result of the outcome.55 Van Gorkom involved a proposed leveraged
buy-out merger of TransUnion by Marmon Group.56 TransUnion’s
chairman and CEO chose a proposed price for the deal without
consultation with outside financial experts.57 The proposed merger was
subject to board approval, and at the board meeting numerous
important pieces of information were never raised or considered.58 The
court stated that the rule “is a presumption that in making a business
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”59 Thus, the decision was not protected by
the rule because it was not well informed, and the court found that the
directors breached their duty of care to the corporation.
In addition to being the seminal case for requiring informed
decisions by the board, the Van Gorkom decision is also important for
prompting the codification of Delaware General Corporation Law
§ 102(b)(7), which permits Delaware companies (with shareholder
52. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
53. See State Corporation Laws, U.S. LEGAL, http://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of
-corporations/state-corporation-laws/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (The majority of states have
adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) as the basis of their own state laws, though
each of these states has modified the provisions of the MBCA.).
54. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
55. Gordon Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race to Protect Directors from
Liability?, Harv. L. School., 37–40, (Sept. 2004), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs
/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Moodie_1.pdf
56. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 863.
57. Id. at 866–68, 878.
58. Id. at 865, 877.
59. Id. at 872.

V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

230

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

4/28/2015 3:53 PM

[Vol. 31

approval) to adopt charter amendments that exculpate directors from
personal liability for breaches of the duty of care.60 Such a charter
amendment was adopted by a large majority of Delaware
corporations.61 Successfully proving a breach of the duty of care
already means overcoming the business judgment rule, which lends to
directors a presumption that they have exercised due care.62 Therefore,
without the § 102(b)(7) exculpation provision, the duty of care is
already the most difficult path for a shareholder plaintiff to prove
director liability.63 With it, at least for shareholders of Delaware
corporations, a claim for breach of the duty of care typically gets tossed
on a motion to dismiss and, therefore, is generally avoided altogether.64
However, § 102(b)(7) only exculpates directors from the duty of care,
and the business judgment rule is invoked only when the board has
made a decision.65 As a result, without expressly alleging a breach of a
duty of care or loyalty, if a claim involves activities of the corporation
that were not subject to a director decision, then the court will generally
review it as an oversight claim under the duty of loyalty.66 This is
important for the purposes of this article because the combination of

60. See 8 Del. Code Ann. § 102(b)(7) (2014).
61. Moodie, supra note 55, at 39–40; see also Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for
Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 914 (1990).
62. In Delaware, “courts routinely dismiss complains pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) based on
the business judgment rule.” NCS Healthcare, Inc. v. Candlewood Partners, LLC, 827 N.E.2d
797, 803 n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, 835 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio 2005). The presumption
of the business judgment rule attaches ab initio. See Shant Chalian & Kristen Bandura, The
Business Judgement Rule and the Entire Fairness Doctrine, ROBSINON & COLE, LLP, http://
www.rc.com/documents/Primer%20on%20Business%20Judgment%20Rule.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
63. See HURT, supra note 47, at 19 (“[t]he legal avenue with the least probability of success
for imposing liability on directors and officers at such firms is a lawsuit alleging a breach of the
duty of care.”).
64. In most cases brought since In re Caremark alleging a breach of duty to monitor risk,
the complaints generally avoid choosing breach of a duty of care or loyalty, at least expressly. See
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The theory
of relief on which the claim rests is not immediately apparent.”).
65. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004) (“The business judgment rule commonly is understood today as a
standard of liability by which courts review the decision of the board of directors.”).
66. See HURT, supra note 47, at n.92 (“If the claim points to activities of the firm that were
not subject to a director decision, then the court will interpret this as an oversight claim under the
duty of loyalty.”).
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the business-judgment rule and the exculpation provisions makes the
duty of care a losing bet for shareholders.67
The very limited enforcement of the duty of care is of course a
nod to the overarching preference that boards be risk-tolerant instead
of risk-averse. The nearly complete absolving of liability for all director
decisions that results from the combination of the business judgment
rule and exculpation provisions, however, may render the need for
accountability futile. After all, the result demonstrates a deferment to
the need for risk-taking and may create conditions for excessive risk
taking.68 The resulting lopsided balance of interests may ignore the idea
that “accountability can have the healthy effect of deterring the almostegregious mistakes and of incentivizing thoughtful decision-making
processes,”69 and the prospect that this could maximize shareholder
wealth.70 Nevertheless, Delaware courts have for years accepted that
shareholders are generally okay with the possibility that directors make
mistakes.71
Under the duty of loyalty, board members must execute their
actions in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation,
exercising the care an ordinary person would use under similar
circumstances.72 The duty of loyalty generally arises through a conflict
of interest created by a director that diverts corporate assets or usurps
opportunities or information from the corporation for personal gain.
For the purpose of this article, a categorization of a claim under the
duty of loyalty is important in light of the above described exculpation

67. See Jill A. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 652 (2006) (“The combined effect of the business judgment rule and
director exculpation provisions is to limit most fiduciary duty claims to breaches of the duty of
loyalty . . .”).
68. See HURT, supra note 47, at n.101 (noting that enforcement of the duty of care reflects
a balance between honoring the authority of directors while also holding them to some standard
of accountability, but that “[t]he balance in that equation definitely seems to tip toward
‘authority’”).
69. Id.
70. If comparing two assumed diversified shareholder investment portfolios between (1) a
broad sample set of less risky yet more careful decisions under greater judicial scrutiny and (2) a
broad sample set of more risky decisions with complete autonomy and deference, there is no
empirical evidence demonstrating that (2) maximizes shareholder wealth. See Andrew S. Gold, A
Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith,
and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 404 (2007).
71. This is not unlike the generally passive acceptance that the USPTO makes mistakes
issuing patents.
72. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
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clauses and the application of the business judgment rule to director
decisions. To be clear, without availability of an exculpation clause or
the business judgment rule, claims for a breach of the duty of loyalty
in general could have an increased survivability relative to claims for
breach of the duty of care. This is especially critical because the duty
of oversight73 established by In re Caremark in 1996 was confirmed to
categorically fall under the duty of loyalty, and not the duty of care, by
Stone v. Ritter ten years later.74 As a result, despite the generally
unsuccessful track record of Caremark claims in practice, it is assumed
that, because of the nonexistence of an exculpation clause or the
business judgment rule, these claims should at least have a better
chance of surviving a motion to dismiss and being heard on their merits.
This is the effect that the decision in Stone intended: save the duty of
oversight from extinction and allow its enforcement. This is a special
recognition of its importance and a potential clue regarding its
enforcement—a point of emphasis for this article. The categorization
under a duty of loyalty also has limiting effects on enforcement,
specifically, liability is conditioned upon proof of scienter or bad faith.
The balance of these effects is key to a claim’s survivability, and will
be discussed in the following sections.
2. In re Caremark
In 1963, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. became
the first Delaware decision to recognize the board of directors’
responsibility to prevent corporate misconduct.75 Shareholders of the
corporation sued the board for failing to prevent employees from
violating federal antitrust law.76 Although the court rejected the claim,
it acknowledged a fiduciary duty to monitor wrongdoing.77 The duty
was qualified under three characteristics. First, the duty fell under the
duty of care as a part of the board’s responsibility to oversee

73. The duty of oversight created by the In re Caremark case is also commonly referred to
as the duty to monitor. See PAN, supra note 47.
74. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); see HURT, supra note 47, at 31 (“Though this evolving
interpretation may seem unexpected, this judicial turn saves the oversight cause of action from
extinction . . . these cases will continue to be brought and have a chance of surviving a demand
hearing in the derivative context.”).
75. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
76. Id. at 127, 129.
77. Id. at 129–30.
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management action.78 Second, the duty only extended to corporate
actions that are illegal.79 Third, the duty would only arise if “something
occurs to put [members of the board] on suspicion that something is
wrong.”80 In other words, the court felt that directors did not need to
“install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing.”81
Thirty years later, the Delaware Court of Chancery reconsidered
the duty to monitor in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation (hereinafter referred to as “Caremark”). Today, despite its
qualification by later decisions such as Stone v. Ritter, the Caremark
decision is the most comprehensive exploration of the duty to
monitor—the oversight duty—and claims for breach of this duty are
frequently referred to as “Caremark-claims.”
Caremark International had been the target of a federal
investigation of payments made by Caremark International employees
to physicians in exchange for patient referrals. Such payments were
illegal—a violation of federal healthcare regulations, specifically the
Anti-Referral Payments Law.82 The board was not aware of the
violations nor did they directly authorize them.83 Under Delaware
precedent at the time, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., the board
would not be responsible for these actions unless there were red flags.84
However, the presiding Chancellor Allen was compelled to create a
stronger duty in the absence of red flags “to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system . . . exists.”85 A limit was also placed
on this duty, in particular, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to
assure a reasonable information and reporting system [exists]—will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability.”86 Nevertheless, a much debated oversight duty, and the road
that will develop it, had been initiated.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62.
Id. at 971.
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963).
In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
Id. at 971.
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3. Stone v. Ritter
In its 2006 Stone v. Ritter decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed Caremark.87 Facing “a classic Caremark claim”, the court was
met with a derivative suit filed by shareholders against the board of
AmSouth Bancorporation for failure to institute an adequate system for
monitoring legal compliance with banking law.88 The failures led to
fines and penalties sanctioned against the bank.89 Nevertheless, the
court ultimately dismissed the claim because the company had in place
a comprehensive information reporting system that the board designed
itself.90 The system failed, but the board had satisfied its monitoring
duties in good faith. For most commentators, the dismissal was
apparently not a surprise, nor was the court’s upholding of the
Caremark standard.91 The court did, however, maneuver the Caremark
standard into a two-option test for director liability. The court stated:
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions
predicate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly
failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls,
or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.92

Two elements of the Stone v. Ritter decision, however, were to the
surprise of many people and, as will be described in the next section,
create survivability and a trail for the duty to monitor that has not yet
been blazed. First, the court held that Caremark was really about the
directors’ duty to act in good faith, and second, the duty to act in good
faith is subsumed by the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care as
Chancellor Allen had believed in Caremark.93 The court explained
itself:

87. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).
88. Id. at 364–365.
89. Id. at 365–366.
90. Id. at 369.
91. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of
Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2007) (“The outcome in the case was not
surprising . . . [and the upholding of the Caremark standard] confirms what most observers
expected.”).
92. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; see also Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra
note 91, at 1777.
93. Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1769.
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The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the
requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a
condition, “of the fundamental duty of loyalty.” It follows that
because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in
Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director oversight
liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of
loyalty.94

This is significant as the exculpation clause is not applicable
(AmSouth had one), and the court must not dismiss the claim if it
adequately pleads facts that support a Caremark claim. Furthermore,
the duty of loyalty is no longer just about conflict of interest, but now
it includes good faith, or rather, bad faith.95
4. A Duty to Monitor Today and Tomorrow
According to Hill and McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and its progeny
of cases creates three new categories under the duty of loyalty: (1)
“structural bias”, or excessive deference to other directors; (2) cases
involving self-interest but also core corporate concerns, therefore not
falling squarely within the traditional duty of loyalty, and (3) conduct
involving illegality—“a ‘culpable’ lack of diligence to prevent illegal
acts, such as was alleged in Stone itself and in Caremark, or actual
commission of illegal acts.”96 It is the third category with which this
article concerns itself.
A reasonable argument against inclusion of a duty to monitor
illegal acts under the duty of loyalty is set forth by Stephen Bainbridge.
In many cases an illegal act by an executive is simply a miscalculation
of risk or the associated cost-benefit analysis, and therefore is a
business decision that should receive deference under the business
judgment rule.97 However, Hill and McDonnell articulate “several
reasons why we might want to treat illegal behavior differently, with
less legal deference.”98 Their reasoning deserves full discovery here:

94. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–370.
95. Some commentators believe that the Stone v. Ritter decision may leave only one single
overarching duty—the duty of loyalty. Commenting on the Stone v. Ritter decision, Hill and
McDonnell applaud the decision and add that “we think the duty of care in total, including both
Caremark-type care and the more generic inattention-type care, is properly understood as largely
subsumed by the duty of loyalty.” See Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note
91, at 1770.
96. Id. at 1780–1784.
97. Id. at 1784; See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006097.
98. Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1784.
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For one, the directors’ willingness to tolerate or engage in illegal
conduct may be a proxy for their willingness to engage in conduct
that more directly diverges with the shareholders’ interests.
Someone who sets out to break the law often displays stealth and a
willingness to pursue a more parochial interest over a competing
more general interest: their own personal interest over the interests
of others . . . or their corporations’ interest over more general social
welfare . . . Shareholders are also citizens, and insofar as laws
advance the general social welfare, citizens care about that. A
diversified shareholder with small stakes in any one corporation
may well find that the public interest predominates over the
corporate interest.”99

Hill and McDonnell confirm separately that “the most intelligible
construction [of the rationale supporting the board’s duties regarding
illegal conduct] includes harm to shareholders and harm to society.”100
After all, some illegal conduct—including patent infringement—might
certainly benefit shareholders monetarily. In any case, it is certain that
where a board actively engages in “conduct involving illegality,” to be
distinguished from neglecting to monitor illegal activity, liability
results.101 To satisfy its duty, a board must abide by its Caremark
duties, or rather ensure that it has in good faith put in place an
information reporting system to monitor any such wrongdoing.
Many commentators have debated applicability of the duty to
monitor to find director liability in the wake of the most recent financial
crisis. The exercise requires the matching of the duty to monitor legal
compliance with the duty to monitor business or financial risk
generally.102 The rationale for maintaining the duty in this context—
harm to society—is painfully present as evidenced in the aftermath of
the crisis. The commentators have taken different sides, however, in
concluding whether the duty does or should exist in this context. Hill
and McDonnell find that “the financial crisis helps make the case that
board monitoring should extend to conduct potentially imposing
significant harm on shareholders,” despite the admission that “illegality
was . . . ultimately not that important” a part of the crisis.103 Going
further, they add that “we would explicitly state that the Caremark
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1784–85 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties, supra note 19, at 866.
See id.; see also HURT, supra note 47.
Hill & McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties, supra note 19.
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oversight duty includes a duty to monitor business risk generally, not
just the risk of breaking the law.”104 Indeed, the court in In re Citigroup,
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation seemed to suggest the same,
without so explicitly stating or holding.105
Christine Hurt, Professor of Law and Director, Program in
Business Law & Policy at the University of Illinois College of Law,
concludes that the failure to extend the duty to monitor to business or
financial risk, and the completely unsuccessful duty to monitor claims
that arose from the financial crisis, is “a logical and reasoned”
outcome.106 First, like Hill and McDonnell, Hurt expressly
distinguishes the duty to monitor financial risk from the duty to monitor
violations of law or regulations.107 Hurt does categorize the actions
causing the financial crisis as “excessive risk-taking,” but that which
was “otherwise legal.”108 Second, Hurt argues that recognizing a duty
to monitor financial risk would be imprudent because a breach of the
duty would be identifiable only in hindsight.109 Third, Hurt suggests
that the duty to manage financial risk would also encompass failures to
take risks, making risk-averse firms also susceptible to breach of duty
claims.110 Next, Hurt argues that a Caremark claim may only be
successful if a board does not have a reporting or risk-management
system in place. Hurt writes, “[a] modern U.S. publicly-held
corporation that faces any type of financial risk will almost certainly
have a system in place.” Further, Hurt proposes that decisions by their
risk committees regarding the levels of risk that are present should be
protected because, presumably, only hindsight can determine if the
levels were excessive.111 Finally, Hurt notes that a duty to manage
financial risk implies that a court is able to determine the optimal
amount of risk, or at least what is too much or too little risk, and this

104. Id. at 873.
105. In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009).
106. See HURT, supra note 47, at 7, 45 (“[N]ot only does a duty to manage financial risk not
exist within the prevailing corporate law framework of fiduciary duties, but [] . . . recognizing a
separate duty to manage financial risk would be imprudent.”).
107. Id. at 4 (“Most of the behavior at the heart of the financial crisis was not obviously
intentional violations of criminal laws or other regulations, but risky trading practices involving
mortgage-related derivatives.”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 7–8.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 39–40.
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would be impossible for financial risks. The next section will attempt
to show that these arguments do not translate to the patent risk context.
B. Fiduciary Duties and Patent Risk
Board fiduciary duties related to intellectual property have
surprisingly been the subject of very little academic comment. To the
author’s knowledge, there has been no academic comment on board
fiduciary duties related to the management of patent infringement risk.
Robert Sterne and Trevor Chaplick likewise acknowledged that it is “a
topic that has received surprisingly little attention.”112 Nevertheless, as
the recognition of patent asset value increases, and as patent
infringement filings rise in tandem with the fixed costs of patent
litigation and the variable costs of losing, a duty to monitor excessive
risk-taking relative to patent infringement becomes ever more
important. This section will demonstrate that this duty not only likely
exists, but there is good reason to lobby for its greater acknowledgment
and effectiveness.
1. Patent Risk Management in Practice
Risk management related to patent infringement is complex.
Patent rights are probabilistic in nature, and every measurement of the
risk associated with the proximity of a company’s footprint—its
products or services—to problematic patents is comprised of
estimating and weighting multiple probabilities. Colleen Chien has
provided a summary of the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics that
should be examined, as well as the correlation of some of those
characteristics with patents that are actually litigated.113 She notes that
“it leaves for future exploration the development of higher-resolution
predictive models.”114 These models would presumably help patent
risk-takers determine probabilities associated with these characteristics
needed to make an informed risk management decision including,
without exhaustion, (1) the probability that all problematic patents have
been found; (2) the probability that the company’s footprint infringes
an identified problematic patent, (3) the probability that the

112. Robert Sterne & Trevor Chaplick, Why Directors Must Take Responsibility for
Intellectual Property, IAM MAG., Feb.–Mar. 2005, at 16.
113. See Chien, supra note 12, at 328–29 (noting that “it leaves for future exploration the
development of higher-resolution predictive models.”).
114. Id.
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problematic patent is valid, (4) the probability that the owner of the
problematic patent would or is able to enforce the patent, (5) the
probability that a license would be offered at a reasonable price relative
to expected fixed plus variable litigation costs, and (6) the probability
that designing around the problematic patent would cost more than a
license or expected fixed plus variable litigation costs.115 The equation
is not scientific, yet the resources and information now available to
patentees allow each of these probabilities to be reasonably
approximated, at least to the extent that an action can be determined,
ex-ante, to be “excessive risk taking” vs. “reasonable risk taking.”116
As Colleen Chien has expressed, “the uncertainty about which patents
are going to be asserted can be reduced through identification of the
riskiest patents ahead of time,” and litigation risk may be assessed by
examining intrinsic and acquired characteristics which help a risk-taker
understand “the economic value of the patent, the characteristics of the
owner of the patent, and her propensity to litigate.”117
Many companies exercise diligent and sophisticated patent risk
procedures.118 Yet, there is little published evidence that patent risk
management decisions made by the company, based on the
probabilities identified above, are routinely made ex-ante a problem
arising or, if they are, that the decisions are part of a systematic
oversight procedure put in place or monitored by the board of
directors.119 Deference should undoubtedly be given to the experts on
legal matters in the legal division of a corporation with respect to
assessing problematic patents identified in a freedom to operate search.
115. Id. Chien’s article demonstrates that patent risk management may be reasonably
manageable, and that more than just intrinsic qualities of a patent must be examined, including
acquired characteristics such as recorded transfers, collateralizations, re-examinations, and
change in size of patentee. However, she points out that, notwithstanding the ability to assess the
risk presented by any one patent, the ability to actually find all relevant patents or “the real party
in interest” is frustrated by patent office inefficiencies. See, e.g., id. at 327–28.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Hearing on Abusive Patent Litigation: H.R. 845, supra note 18 (evidencing the
procedures that companies like Cisco, Johnson & Johnson, Adobe, and JC Penny take to evaluate
patent risk).
119. Id. (There are 264 pages of testimony from senior counsel at numerous companies
explaining the risk that patent assertion presents to their companies, detailing how that risk is
presented to the company, the actions the companies must take and the impact those actions have,
but there is no mention that those actions, or the ex-ante decisions the companies made which
may have given rise to the risk, or the systems in place to address those risks, were ever brought
to or reviewed by the board of the companies.).

V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

240

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

4/28/2015 3:53 PM

[Vol. 31

However, to the extent the assessment of such a patent results in a set
of probabilities, the decision to take on risk in light of the probabilities
should be subject to systematic oversight. To the extent that the
decision could result in “bet-the-company” litigation or involve
potential damages liabilities that would affect shareholder value, it
seems reasonable that the systematic oversight required would involve
information reporting lines reaching a very high level, or even the
board.
Many other companies, as expert commentators have pointed out,
may be motivated to ignore problematic patents, and in fact do in order
to avoid having knowledge of infringed patents.120 Despite the merits
of avoiding knowledge in light of willful infringement risk, this
decision in and of itself increases the likelihood of lawsuit, and to the
extent the risk in any given case would be large enough to affect
shareholder value, it seems reasonable that there should be additional
oversight of these practices.
2. Defining the Duty
Caremark and Stone are clear: monitoring and oversight are key
to the good-faith obligation of boards of directors as corporate
fiduciaries. Also clear is the fact that not all activities of corporate
employees can or should be monitored. Thus, in the oversight context,
it is important to discern the board’s obligation "with respect to the
organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the
corporation functions within the law to achieve its purposes."121 After
Stone, as it relates to illegal conduct, we know the obligation requires
directors to (1) establish monitoring systems and (2) pay appropriate
attention to relevant information, whether internal or external, to ensure
that they are able to spot "red flags."122 A single dramatic incident
pointing to a flaw in a monitoring system may give rise to a red flag, as
120. See Chien, supra note 12, at 286 (“Successful searching carries a penalty—the risk of
treble damages. As a result, many companies do not even try to identify the patents that their
products may tread upon, remaining ignorant of the risks they run until it is too late.”); see also
ROBERT STERNE & DAVID CORNWELL, WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS A BARRIER TO
DISSEMINATION OF PATENT INFORMATION, SEDONA CONF. ON PATENT LITIGATION 3 (2002)
(“Many products or services could be covered by claims of a multitude of unexpired patents. Thus,
many normal competitors do not perform a freedom to operate investigation to try to determine if
there are patent infringement problems; their cost/benefit analysis militates against such an
investigation.”).
121. Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73.
122. Id. at 368.
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can a series of events over a period of time sufficient to raise them to
the board's attention.123 It follows that liability stems from either (i)
“utterly fail[ing] to implement any reporting or information system or
controls” or (ii) “having implemented such system or controls,
consciously fail[ing] to monitor or oversee its operations.”124 In
addition, a scienter element is required, such that a plaintiff must plead
“particularized facts . . . that [the directors] had ‘actual or constructive
knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”125
Therefore, if a duty to monitor patent risk exists, a set of facts
fitting within the following hypothetical would presumably give rise to
a Caremark claim: a corporation (a)(i) systematically neglects to
conduct any or adequate search for problematic patents before creating
a footprint,126 or (a)(ii) conducts such freedom-to-operate searches but
does not have a system in place for monitoring or ensuring proper
oversight of the risk-taking decisions made relative to the risk
probabilities discovered through the search or any notices of
infringement received,127 and (b) its board knows or should have
known that (i) the corporation operates in a litigious patent space, (ii)
the corporation does not own every patent that would be needed to
cover its footprint, (iii) the corporation or the corporation’s competitors
have been the target of demand letters, (iv) the corporation’s
competitors have purchased or sold patents that are identified to be
problematic patents, and/or (v) the validity of the corporation’s patents
covering its footprint have been challenged by a competitor.128
Additional hypothetical scenarios could also give rise to a claim, for
example, replacing (a)(i) or (a)(ii) with “whose board decides to
knowingly infringe” or “whose board, having knowledge of an
employee decision to knowingly infringe, neglects to become properly
informed of the risks.”129

123. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 733
(2007).
124. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
125. See Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009); see also Stone,
911 A.2d at 370 (“[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”).
126. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
127. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
128. See Lyondell Chemical Co., 970 A.2d at 240; see also In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
129. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967–72.
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3. Recognizing the Duty
Support for recognizing a duty to monitor patent risk can be found
in case law, policy, and logic.
Case Law. Caremark tells us that the oversight duty covers
employee or corporate conduct in violation of law or regulations. Patent
infringement is conduct prohibited by federal statute, namely, 35
U.S.C. §271. Patent infringement is not criminal conduct, and a claim
for patent infringement is brought in a civil suit.130 It does not carry
criminal penalties. Instead, it is a prohibited act in violation of the
exclusive rights of a patentee, granting right of the patentee to bring
action for damages or injunction.131 Copyright infringement, on the
other hand, may be a criminal act with imposable statutory fines.132
Notably, copyright infringement requires actual copying—or a
volitional act demonstrating culpability133—while patent infringement
is a strict liability offense requiring no intent, knowledge or even
access. Nevertheless, there is no language in Caremark and its line of
cases that expressly restricts the duty to monitor to criminal conduct.
Moreover, all of the rhetoric, in these cases and from commentators
since, has been “wrongdoing”, “illegal” conduct, or “compliance with
the law.”134 “Illegal” conduct covers all acts forbidden by law,
especially but not exclusively criminal acts.135 Chancellor Allen
provided in Caremark that the purpose of the system and information
reporting that a board is required to put in place is so that the board may

130. But see Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (the
Supreme Court imported a criminal concept of intent—willful blindness—into the statute for
patent infringement).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2013).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2013); see also MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§15.01[A][2]; see also United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991) (holding
that willful infringement means a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty”)
(quoting Cheek v. United States, 298 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)).
133. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1369–70 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Culpability may simply be proven by “access.” See PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 9.1.1 (3d ed. 2011); NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 13.01[B].
134. See Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1784 (“Our third
category within the overall umbrella of good faith is ‘conduct involving illegality,’ a ‘culpable’
lack of diligence to prevent illegal acts, such as was alleged in Stone itself and in Caremark, or
actual commission of illegal acts, the most notable example of which is perhaps Miller v.
AT&T.”); see Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130 (using “employee wrongdoing”).
135. See OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/defini
tion/american_english/illegal (“Contrary to or forbidden by law, especially criminal law.”).

V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/28/2015 3:53 PM

ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET

243

“reach informed judgments concerning [] the corporation's compliance
with law.”136
There is a stark difference between illegal conduct and excessive
risk-taking. Christine Hurt’s argument that the duty to monitor should
not extend to financial risk taking because, after all, “[m]ost of the
behavior at the heart of the financial crisis was not obviously
intentional violations of criminal laws or other regulations,” does not
impact the duty’s application to patent infringement. It seems clear that
patent infringement falls squarely within the conduct that gives rise to
a duty to monitor. There is risk in patents, however, that are not actually
litigated and found to be infringing. In many cases, the costs or losses
associated with patent infringement do not actually result from a
finding of patent infringement, but from settlement as a result of
alleged patent infringement.137 For the purposes of this article, the two
will be treated the same, acknowledging that patent risk arises because
of the potential illegality of action, and the duty to manage the risk
includes preventing conduct that could be illegal just the same as
conduct that is illegal.
Policy. As has already been discussed, Hill and McDonnell (2007)
proffer that “the most intelligible construction of [the rationale
supporting the board’s duties regarding illegal conduct] includes harm
to shareholders and harm to society.”138 Specifically, “[s]hareholders
are also citizens, and insofar as laws advance the general social welfare,
citizens care about that. A diversified shareholder with small stakes in
any one corporation may well find that the public interest predominates
over the corporate interest.”139 In the patent context, unknown
infringement by competitors could be assumed to directly harm the
financial profile of the corporation that owns the infringed patent, as
any market share or other exclusive benefit that could be held by the
136. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 170.
137. See Chien, supra note 12, at 324 (Chien used data from litigated patents to support her
model demonstrating that acquired characteristics are obtainable and correlate positively with
patent risk, however, she notes that the entire picture of patent risk is not painted solely by what
is actually litigated. “[L]itigated patents represent a subset of two other groupings of patents with
relevance to patent risk: potentially infringed patents and potentially asserted patents. Of these
two groups, potentially infringed patents are of less concern from a defensive perspective because
of the pervasive non-enforcement that others have described. However, potentially-asserted, yet
unlitigated, patents represent potentially costly threats to companies, albeit ones that avoid the
expense and disruption associated with litigation.”).
138. Hill & McDonnell, Expanding Duty of Loyalty, supra note 91, at 1784–85.
139. Id.
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patent owner is diluted or eliminated.140 The infringer, however,
assumes the risk of patent infringement that could negatively affect its
financial profile.141 As evidence, Bessen and Meurer have
demonstrated that a patent litigation-filing announcement has a
negative effect on defendant firms, after controlling certain factors
pertaining to firm characteristics.142 Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles showed
that, while a successful patent litigation can have a positive wealth
effect for a plaintiff, it is generally not as significant as the negative
wealth effect for the loser.143 Exemplifying this net negative wealth
effect, the announcement that Samsung lost its patent litigation against
Apple and was ordered to pay $2 billion in damages resulted in a
decrease of its stock price by 5%, while Apple’s stock price increased
by 2%.144 Therefore, assuming diversified shareholders, a culture of
rampant infringement and patent litigation could mean a detriment to
investments that exceeds any benefit to investments.145 Factoring in the
dead weight fixed costs spent by both sides in patent litigation, the net
position of a diversified shareholder could be negatively affected in a
culture where excessive patent risk is not monitored and prevented.

140. One alternative view, however, is that a market for a technology is made larger by
additional market participants, and despite widespread infringement of a patent holder’s patent on
the technology the patent holder benefits from participating in a larger market with increased
adoption of the invention. This is the theory proffered by Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk, when offering
Tesla’s patents to competitors via “open source” licensing. See Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are
Belong To You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent
-are-belong-you.
141. After a federal jury in Pittsburgh ordered Marvell Technology Group to pay a $1.17
billion award for infringing Carnegie Mellon patents covering integrated circuits, Marvell’s stock
price fell to a low of $6.98 per share at its lowest point resulting in an approximate market
capitalization of around $3.4 billion dollars—half of what it is today. See Carnegie Mellon
University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at *15–16 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://www.cmu.edu/patent-lawsuit/images/timeline/march
-2014-court-opinion.pdf.
142. James E. Bessen & Michael Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J. OF L.
ECON. & POL’Y 59 (2013).
143. Sanjai Bhagat, John Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications
of Corporate Lawsuits, 27 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1998).
144. Sanjun & Changi, supra note 17, at 4.
145. Michael Orey & Moira Herbst, Inside Nathan Myhrvold’s Mysterious New Idea
Machine, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 2, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories
/2006-07-02/inside-nathan-myhrvolds-mysterious-new-idea-machine (Nathan Myhrvold, former
executive at Microsoft, stating that “there has long been a culture of intentionally infringing
patents or turning a blind eye to potential infringement,” and accounting that when he was at
Microsoft this was part of the accepted business culture in the software industry.).
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Likewise, shareholders and society have an interest in furthering
innovation to create new products and services. For shareholders,
innovation provides new value to current investments and new
investment opportunities. For society, innovation provides new utility
and efficiencies that increase a standard of living. One of many
objectives of the patent system is to ensure more useful inventions, and
indeed the U.S. Constitution provides for the creation of intellectual
property rights “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts.”146 Because a patent discloses the invention publicly, it enables
others to learn from and build upon the invention and, at the same time,
directs them away from research that might wastefully duplicate the
work of the patent holder.147 Patent infringement, then, thwarts this
objective and therefore the benefit of the patent system to shareholders
and society in general. Moreover, as Bressen and Meurer (2013) have
offered, the private costs of patent litigation result in a disincentive to
investing in innovation, and as a result, the risk of infringement acts
like a “tax” on innovation.148
In the same vein, the practice of ignoring patents in light of risking
willful infringement also works against the patent system objective of
disseminating information about inventions to promote innovation.
Robert Sterne and David Cornwell (2002) identified this dichotomy in
the willful infringement doctrine, writing the below, albeit prior to the
doctrine changing a bit in In re Seagate149 in 2007:
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added); see also Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R.
Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 1031
(1998).
147. Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J. OF L. AND ECON. 265 (1977).
148. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 142.
149. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (the Federal Circuit overruled the prior “due care”
standard for willful infringement, replacing it with a recklessness standard. To prove willfulness
under this new standard, a patentee must first show by clear and convincing evidence that an
accused infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent. A “totality of the circumstances” analysis applies, and the accused
infringer’s “state of mind” is not relevant to the inquiry. In applying In re Seagate, some courts
have treated actual notice as a prerequisite to an assertion of willful infringement. Some courts
have even required notice of an infringement claim—not just notice of another’s patent rights—
as a prerequisite to willful infringement. Even if actual notice is considered a prerequisite to a
finding of willful infringement, however, Seagate does not appear to have affected the fairly low
bar for what constitutes actual notice); see Jason Finch, Willfulness Allegations Post-Seagate—
The Role of Actual Notice, BAKER BOTTS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, available at
http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/2010NovemberIPReportWillfulnessAllegationsPostSea

V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

246

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

4/28/2015 3:53 PM

[Vol. 31

The quid pro quo of granting the inventor a time-limited exclusive
right is the adequate disclosure in the patent of information about
the protected invention to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention. By examining the patent literature,
the public can benefit from the information transferred by the
inventor, and build on this body of knowledge. By hoisting itself on
the advances of others, a new inventor can emerge to make further
advances . . . Unfortunately, willful patent infringement effectively
prevents this centralized body of information from being examined
by the people most interested in it, competitors of the patent
owner . . . The laudable goal of protecting the patent owner from
infringement by an unscrupulous competitor is turned on its head in
these contexts because the normal competitor cannot risk obtaining
knowledge of the unasserted patents of the patent owner.150

It follows that there is a public interest in a duty to monitor patent
risk, including implementing and paying due attention to a system that
adequately searches for, assesses, and makes informed decisions
regarding risk-taking relative to problematic patents. Such a system
will not only help avoid patent risk, but should help guarantee the
intended use of published patent information to prevent infringement
and further innovation.
Logic. The frequency with which patent litigation is being filed
and the risk that patent litigation may present to shareholder-value
should be sufficient to pay careful attention. Because the fixed costs of
patent litigation remain constant without regard to the size of the
company paying them, it is an event that could be devastating to cash
flow for small companies. To gain a sense for who that covers, 96.7%
of all employer companies in the U.S. have less than $10 million in
annual revenues. In view of the fact that average fixed costs of patent
litigation, when at least $1 million is at risk, is $2.5 million, defending
gate.htm (last visited March 16, 2014); see also Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-CV158, 2008 WL 7182476, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (“‘To willfully infringe a patent, the
patent must exist and one must have knowledge of it.’”) (citing State Industries Inc. v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 751 F.2d 1126, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Jardin v. Datallegro, Inc., No. 08cv1462IEG-RBB, 2009 WL 186194, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (holding that Seagate did not change
the pleading requirements for willful infringement and that the plaintiff need only plead the
equivalent of ‘[the accused infringer acted] with knowledge of the patent and his infringement’ to
meet the requirements of Rule 8) (quoting Sentry Prot. Prods. Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d
910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also Creative Internet Advertising Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., No.
6:07cv354, 2009 WL 2382132, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2009) (stating that an accused infringer
must be on notice of an infringement claim to have willfully infringed).
150. See STERNE & CORNWELL, supra note 120, at 3–4.

V31_MCCLURE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/28/2015 3:53 PM

ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PATENT MARKET

247

patent litigation could require at least 25% of the annual revenues of
more than 96% of the companies in this country.151 Exacerbating the
risk, empirical data shows that patent trolls target companies in this
category quite often.152 It is unlikely that many of these companies
implement a patent risk management system necessary to minimize this
risk, much less satisfy a duty to monitor illegal patent infringement.153
Empirical data shows that patent infringement is an event that
negatively impacts shareholder value, as markets do react to the
outcome of patent litigation events.154 Notwithstanding the potential
outcomes of unsuccessful patent litigation, including damages and
injunction, a firm could lose additional value in market reaction. With
three decisions in 2013 that exceeded a billion dollars, and a median
damages award between 2007 and 2012 of $4.9 million,155 the risk is
such that a system for monitoring actions that could give rise to that
risk seems logical.
As has been mentioned, some commentators have made a case
against extending the duty to monitor financial risk. One argument was
that that recognizing a duty to monitor financial risk would be
imprudent because a breach of the duty would be identifiable only in

151. See Statistics about Business Size, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at
https://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html#RcptSize (last visited March 11, 2014) (96.7% of
employer firms make $10 million or less in annual receipts).
152. See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
(Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251
(finding that small and midsize companies with less than $1 billion in revenues now constitute
90% of the unique defendants in patent troll suits; Firms with less than $100 million in revenue
represent 66% of the defendants; Firms with less than $10 million make up 55% of the
defendants).
153. While patent risk management may be manageable, it is expensive and resource
consuming. Depending on the technical complexity of the product and the saturation of the
relevant patent landscape, a complete review of the patent landscape can require hundreds of hours
of review. If done using outside counsel, this can be multiplied by a conservative estimate of
$250/hour, potentially totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars.
154. See Alan Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE. J.L. & TECH. 103
(2013) (finding that the correlation of the outcome of patent litigation events with stock market
reaction is “statistically meaningful”); see also Paula Schliessler, The Effect of Patent Litigation
on Firm Performance—Evidence for Germany, Centre for European Economic Research (Jan.
2013), available at http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13015.pdf (finding evidence that
“defendants are negatively affected by a loss in trial or a settlement deal, while a victory leaves
their rating unchanged. I further show that small and inexperienced defendants are at a
disadvantage compared to larger and more experienced firms, indicating that they are affected
more severely by business disruption and financial distress.”).
155. PWC PATENT LITIG. STUDY, supra note 5; see also Seaman, supra note 10.
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hindsight.156 Unlike financial risk, patent risk is measureable against a
bright line rule: patent infringement is statutorily illicit. In financial
risk, only a bad outcome is measurable, and without a defined act that
is measurable against a law or regulation, a bad outcome requires
discovering breach only after the excessive risk-taking is complete.
This should not follow to the patent risk context because, as has been
highlighted herein, patent risk management is reasonably manageable,
and resources now available make problematic patents increasingly
identifiable and assessable allowing a company to determine an
appropriate action.
A next argument is that the duty to manage financial risk would
also encompass failures to take risks, making risk-averse firms also
susceptible to breach of duty claims.157 As has been described in this
section, this logic would not follow to patent risk because a failure to
take a risk relative to patent infringement means avoiding illegal
conduct and furthering innovation by intentionally designing around
and creating something new. A firm that does not infringe patents
would not be susceptible to breach of a fiduciary duty for intentionally
avoiding illegal conduct.
Another argument for not extending the duty to financial risk is
that a Caremark claim may only be successful if a board does not have
a reporting or risk-management system in place, and “[a] modern U.S.
publicly-held corporation that faces any type of financial risk will
almost certainly have a system in place.”158 As was demonstrated
herein, this author believes that the systems required to satisfy a duty
to monitor patent risk likely to not exist in many companies, and
particularly not in 96.7% of the smaller U.S. firms that may be most
vulnerable to the severity of patent risk consequences. Moreover,
current willful-infringement doctrine may motivate some firms to
ignore patents, and this activity, if intentionally occurring without
appropriate oversight, demonstrates non-existence of an adequate
system in light of the duty.
Finally, it has been argued that a duty to manage financial risk
implies that a court is able to determine the optimal amount of risk, or
at least what is too much or too little risk, and that this would be
impossible for financial risks. Because of the bright line rule of illegal
conduct vs. legal conduct in the patent context, the optimal amount of
risk should be easily ascertainable—an amount which does not infringe
156.
157.
158.

See HURT, supra note 47, at 7–8.
Id.
Id. at 39–40.
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a valid patent. Given that this determination must be made using
probabilities, and not absolutes, the “too much risk” standard should be
one of reasonableness in light of the information known or available.
In summary, the costs and consequences of “too much patent
risk,” or patent infringement, show that a duty to monitor patent risk is
logical. Moreover, the logic behind not extending a duty to monitor
financial risk is not workable in the patent risk management context.
4. Satisfying the Duty
To satisfy its duty to monitor patent risk, a board should (1)
establish a monitoring system which identifies, appropriately assesses
and reports information about patent risk to the level of accountability
corresponding to that risk; and (2) pay appropriate attention to relevant
information, whether internal or external, to ensure that it is able to spot
"red flags" demonstrating patent risk or excessive risk-taking related to
that risk.159 Caremark and its progeny of cases tell us that “red flags”
are important to finding a breach of the duty to monitor. In the patent
context, red flags are difficult to avoid, or ever present, in certain
industries. The consistent “red flag” in industries like
telecommunications where products are covered by hundreds or even
thousands of patents is, quite frankly, that infringement is known,
rampant, and potentially unavoidable.160 Under one view, this
circumstance is so obvious and critical that ignorance of it and failure
to implement a monitoring system could reasonably be deemed to
satisfy the scienter element required by courts. External “red flags” like
this knowledge should at least be imputed to the board in such
industries, requiring additional focus on the monitoring system in
place. The most apparent internal “red flag” is the receipt of demand
letters, demonstrating that competitors or other patent holders believe
its patents are being infringed by the company.

159. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 368.
160. See Orey & Herbst, supra note 145; see also David Streitfeld, E-Commerce Battles
‘Me’-CommerceLP has VROS, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003 (“If you’re selling online, at the most
recent count there are 4,319 patents you could be violating,” said David E. Martin, chief executive
of M-Cam Inc., an Arlington, Va.-based risk-management firm specializing in patents. “If you
also planned to advertise, receive payments for or plan shipments of your goods, you would need
to be concerned about approximately 11,000.”); see also Charles Arthur, Apple Using “Bogus”
Patents To Make Android More Expensive, Says Google, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/04/apple-patents-android-expensive-google
(Google CEO, David Drummond, stating that a smartphone might involve more than 250,000
patent claims).
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As was the case in Caremark and Stone, a finding of breach of the
duty to monitor patent risk will be very difficult as long as a board
ensures a monitoring system is in place and is paid due attention. In
addition, an element of scienter will be required, meaning the board
knew or should have known its conduct was not in compliance with the
law, or it acted in conscious disregard of its duty to act.161 Knowledge
that a company’s products infringe a third party patent, then, followed
by inaction would likely satisfy the bad faith requirement. As a result,
such knowledge should be followed by stopping any infringing activity
or seeking a license from the patent owner.
CONCLUSION
Added accountability for patent infringement helps to avoid the
damaging position that many companies take—ignorance of the issue
until a problem arises.162 It also helps to support the clear intent of the
patent system—to disseminate knowledge and help innovators build
upon the ideas before them. The less companies infringe third party
patents, the less time and resources are spent on litigation and the more
is spent on building more, new useful products. There is support in case
law, policy, and logic for acknowledging a board of director duty to
monitor patent risk. This level of accountability is appropriate, as it is
commensurate with the level of the risk that poses harm to shareholders
and, in aggregate, to society. The duty should be satisfied by
implementing a system that effectively minimizes patent risk by
identifying, assessing, communicating and taking on appropriate risk
relative to problematic patents.

161. See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240.
162. See STERNE & CORNWELL, supra note 120, at 3 (“The thinking of many normal
competitors is that it is much more cost effective to deal with a patent infringement problem once
it surfaces than to unilaterally try to figure out possible problems ahead of time that may never
materialize.”).

